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ABSTRACT 
 
Externalizing proneness, or impulse control and substance abuse problems, has been 
broadly associated with dysregulation in reward sensitivity.  The goal of this investigation 
was to systematically determine the effects of distinct manifestations of externalizing 
proneness, namely disinhibition and substance abuse, on specific aspects of reward 
processing using a Research Domain Criteria approach.  Additionally, this investigation 
examined whether striatal dopamine moderates the impact of externalizing proneness on 
reward processing.  Striatal tonic dopamine levels were operationalized using spontaneous 
eyeblink rate.  Participants completed disinhibition and substance abuse subscales of the brief 
form Externalizing Spectrum Inventory, and then performed assessments of reward wanting 
and learning, devaluation sensitivity, effort expenditure for rewards, and reward-incentivized 
cognitive control.  Results revealed that disinhibition and substance abuse exerted unique 
effects on reward processing, which were moderated by variation in striatal dopamine levels.  
High-disinhibited individuals with low striatal dopamine showed greater reward wanting and 
preferred less physically effortful, smaller rewards.  Individuals with substance abuse 
problems and high striatal dopamine showed enhanced long-term reward learning, while high 
substance users with low dopamine showed enhanced learning of immediately rewarding 
options, exerted greater cognitive effort to obtain rewards, and showed deficits in reward-
incentivized cognitive control. Substance abuse, independent of striatal dopamine, was 
associated with reduced reward devaluation sensitivity.  Collectively, these results suggest 
that in individuals with externalizing proneness, low striatal dopamine may represent a risk 
factor for addiction or elevated impulse control problems. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Externalizing, or impulse control, problems are pervasive and can have substantial 
consequences. Research from the National Comorbidity Survey shows the incidence rate of 
impulse control disorders, including substance abuse conditions, in the United States to be 
approximately 8% to 9% (Insel & Fenton, 2005; Kessler et al., 1994; Wang et al., 2005). In 
addition, many more individuals exhibit subclinical manifestations of disinhibition and 
substance abuse that also have adverse effects. One prominent domain in which externalizing 
tendencies can engender negative consequences is decision making.  In particular, 
externalizing behavior has been linked to impairments in reward-based decisions that 
contrast short-term versus long-term consequences (Bechara & Damasio, 2002).   
 Despite the prevalence of externalizing proneness and the important consequences of 
reward-based decision-making, research aimed at examining the effects of externalizing 
proneness on specific aspects of reward processing is limited.  One way to systematically 
address this issue is to utilize the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) framework.  The RDoC 
characterizes reward processing as the Positive Valence Systems domain and includes eight 
unique constructs or sub-constructs of reward processing, such as reward learning, reward 
valuation (reward “wanting”), effort valuation, habit learning, and long-term responsiveness 
to reward (Cuthbert & Kozak, 2013; Insel et al., 2010). Reward wanting, learning, effort 
valuation, and habit learning all depend on ventral striatum dopaminergic functioning 
(Berridge & Robinson, 1998; Hyman, Malenka, & Nestler, 2006; Treadway et al., 2012). 
While work with sustained responsiveness to reward shows that this construct depends on 
dopamine, limited research has been conducted with this construct and involvement of 
striatal dopamine specifically.  Instead, most work has been focused on the role of the 
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orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and hypothalamus in long-term responsiveness to reward (Elliott, 
Dolan, & Frith, 2000; Weiss, 2005). Thus, the current investigation was aimed at 
investigating (1) the effects of externalizing proneness on reward processing using the RDoC 
framework, and (2) the role of striatal dopamine in moderating these effects.  This not only 
provides a systematic approach to test the proposed research questions, but also contributes 
to the RDoC conceptualization of externalizing behavior.  
1.1 Substance Abuse, Trait Disinhibition, and Dopaminergic Function 
 A clear problem with current research on externalizing proneness and reward-based 
decision-making is that the unique manifestations of externalizing tendencies, namely 
disinhibition and substance abuse, are often conflated (Moeller & Dougherty, 2002).  While 
these two constructs are highly comorbid, they nevertheless represent phenotypically 
distinctive phenomena (Armstrong & Costello, 2002; Finn et al., 2009; Krueger et al., 2007; 
Waldman & Slutske, 2000).  Substance abuse entails recreational or problematic use of drugs 
and alcohol, whereas disinhibition reflects broader tendencies toward nonplanfulness, 
impulsive risk taking, irresponsibility, and alienation from others (Patrick, Kramer, Krueger, 
& Markon, 2013). Thus, a second goal of the current proposal is to test for individual 
contributions of disinhibition and substance abuse on specific aspects of reward processing. 
 Molecular genetic research demonstrates that allelic variation in dopaminergic genes, 
including DRD2 and DRD3, is related both to disinhibitory traits and to substance abuse 
problems (Comings, Muhleman, Ahn, Gysin, & Flanagan, 1994; Derringer et al., 2010; 
Kreek, Nielsen, Butelman, & LaForge, 2005). Moreover, extensive research has 
demonstrated that dopamine plays a critical role in the neural circuitry underlying reward 
learning and wanting (e.g., Berridge & Robinson, 1998; Ikemoto, 2007; Robinson & 
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Berridge, 2000; Wise, 2004). A recent review demonstrated that discrete dopamine-
dependent neurobiological systems underlie wanting and learning aspects of reward 
processing (Baskin-Sommers & Foti, 2015).  Taken together, findings from human 
behavioral and molecular genetic research along with neuroscientific evidence indicate a role 
for genetically based variation in striatal dopaminergic function in general proneness to 
externalizing problems. Although research demonstrates that dopaminergic variation is 
associated with externalizing problems, the exact nature of this relationship for specific 
facets of externalizing problems, such as trait disinhibition and substance abuse (Krueger et 
al., 2007; Patrick et al., 2013), is unclear.  One possibility is that the distinction between 
disinhibition and substance abuse corresponds to differences in striatal dopaminergic 
function. 
1.2 Dopamine and Distinct Aspects of Reward Processing   
 According to incentive-sensitization theory, associative learning mechanisms 
determine the dopaminergic sensitization to incentive salience, a process by which stimuli 
become rewarding and wanted.  Extensive research has demonstrated that dopamine plays a 
critical role in the neural circuitry underlying reward learning and wanting (e.g., Berridge & 
Robinson, 1998; Ikemoto, 2007; Pessiglione, Seymour, Flandin, Dolan, & Frith, 2006; 
Robinson & Berridge, 2000; Wise, 2004).  Specifically, a recent review demonstrated that 
discrete dopamine-dependent neurobiological processes underlie wanting and learning 
aspects of reward responding (Baskin-Sommers & Foti, 2015).  The distinction between 
reward wanting and learning processes is crucial to understanding the role of externalizing 
behavior in reward-based decision making. Physiological reward wanting drives approach 
toward reward and enhances reward motivation. Dopamine signals in the ventral striatum 
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connect incentive value to a reward stimulus (Baskin-Sommers & Foti, 2015).  Learning, on 
the other hand, involves dopamine signaling from the ventral striatum to the prefrontal 
cortex, which updates goal representations and associations between a stimulus and its 
outcome (Baskin-Sommers & Foti, 2015; Everitt & Robbins, 2005; Ma et al., 2010; Motzkin, 
Baskin-Sommers, Newman, Kiehl, & Koenigs, 2014).  Dopaminergic neurons in the 
mesolimbic system encode predictions about a reward and update that prediction based on 
feedback from prediction errors, thus signaling the reward value of stimuli in reinforcement 
learning contexts (Berridge, Robinson, & Aldridge, 2009; Flagel et al., 2011; Glimcher, 
2011; Hollerman & Schultz, 1998).  However, it is unclear whether tonic or phasic striatal 
dopamine is the basis for the effects of wanting and learning processes.  
 Tonic dopamine refers to the baseline level of extrasynaptic dopamine in the brain, 
whereas phasic dopamine refers to the spiking activity of dopamine neurons in response to a 
stimulus, such as a reward signal (Schultz, 1998). Trait impulsivity has been associated with 
decreased D2/D3 autoreceptor availability and increased amphetamine-induced dopamine 
release in the ventral striatum (Buckholtz et al., 2010). Drug or alcohol addiction alters the 
balance between the tonic and phasic dopamine system. Frequent drug use increases tonic 
dopamine levels, which inhibits phasic dopamine release (Grace, 1995). Thus, the dopamine 
system is altered in substance abusers such that tonic striatal dopamine levels are elevated 
and the phasic dopamine system becomes desensitized and weakened in its reactivity (Grace, 
1995). As a function of this, individuals may use substances to restore the tonic-phasic 
dopamine system to equilibrium (Grace, 1995, 2000).  
 This disequilibrium between tonic and phasic dopamine makes it especially important 
to examine how tonic dopamine interacts with substance abuse tendencies to affect reward-
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based behavior.  In regard to reward processing, phasic dopamine activity, in particular, has 
been shown to encode reward prediction errors in the striatum (Ljungberg, Apicella, & 
Schultz, 1992; Niv, Daw, Joel, & Dayan, 2007; Schultz, 1998;Waelti, Dickinson, & Schultz, 
2001). On the other hand, tonic dopamine levels encode the average reward rate (Niv et al., 
2007).  Given the distinct role of striatal tonic and phasic dopamine in reward processing and 
the association between externalizing proneness and dopaminergic gene variation, it is 
possible that differences in dopaminergic function moderate the relationship between 
externalizing proneness aspects of reward processing. Thus, a final goal of the proposed 
research is to investigate how striatal dopamine interacts with trait disinhibition and 
substance abuse to affect reward processing. 
1.3 Current Studies  
 The current investigation entailed four studies to assess the interaction between 
striatal dopamine and externalizing proneness on specific aspects of reward processing.  The 
first study was designed to assess the interaction between externalizing proneness and striatal 
dopamine on reward wanting and learning.  Previous research with substance abuse and 
reward-based decision-making shows mixed findings with some studies observing that 
substance abuse predicts poorer associative learning, and thus poorer reward-based decision-
making, on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara, 2003; Bechara & Damasio, 2002).  
However, other studies find no such deficits (Bolla et al., 2003; Ernst et al., 2003).  
Additionally, research on impulsivity, though quite limited, shows no association between 
trait disinhibition and IGT performance (Upton, Bishara, Ahn, & Stout, 2011). With regard to 
reward wanting, a recent review demonstrates that substance abuse has been associated with 
increased preference for immediate hypothetical monetary and drug rewards over delayed 
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reward using the delay discounting paradigm (Yi, Mitchell, & Bickel, 2010).  However, for 
trait disinhibition, only one study has tested for an effect on reward-based decision making 
separate from its association with substance abuse.  This study, by de Wit et al. (2007), 
demonstrated that nonplanful impulsivity predicted preference for immediate rewards, or 
enhanced “wanting”, but overall composite impulsivity reports were not significantly 
predictive of delay discounting preferences. Although research shows that substance abuse 
predicts poorer associative reward learning and nonplanful impulsiveness is associated with 
increased preference for immediate rewards, work on this topic has been somewhat mixed 
and is quite limited in scope. Consequently, Study 1 examined the interaction between 
externalizing proneness and striatal dopamine on reward wanting (using the delay 
discounting paradigm) and reward learning (using a reinforcement learning task).  
 Study 2 assessed interactions between externalizing proneness and striatal dopamine 
on reward disengagement.  While enhanced learning of action-reward contingencies may be 
beneficial in some situations, such as academic or job-related contexts where increased 
studying or working may lead to better grades and promotions, this is not always the case.  
For example, when action-reward associations are learned between a drug and its rewarding 
properties, then enhanced reward learning may serve as a risk factor for transitioning from 
recreational drug use to addiction (Hogarth et al., 2013).  Thus, Study 2 used a reinforcement 
learning task with a devaluation component, whereby one option becomes devalued, to test 
both reward learning and disengagement, or “devaluation”.   
 The purpose of Study 3 was to investigate the possible interaction between 
externalizing proneness and striatal dopamine on a reward-based decision-making task in 
which one must expend effort to receive rewards.  This tests the “effort valuation” construct 
7 
in the RDoC framework.  Because the delay discounting paradigm does not entail effort-
based decision-making, one remaining question is whether striatal dopamine alters reward 
wanting in individuals with higher externalizing behaviors when one has to expend effort to 
receive rewards.  Previous work on effort expenditure demonstrates that ventral striatal tonic 
dopamine depletion reduces willingness to expend effort to obtain rewards in rats (Treadway 
et al., 2009).  The discrepancy in these findings, in which diminished tonic dopamine leads to 
enhanced encoding of reward prediction errors but also reduces effort expenditure for such 
rewards, emphasizes the need to understand how tonic DA interacts with trait disinhibition to 
predict effort-based decision-making.   
Using the RDoC framework, substance use disorders have been characterized as 
dysregulation of the positive valence systems and cognitive control domains (Sanchez & 
Cruz-Fuentes, 2016).  Therefore, Study 4 was designed to compare reward wanting and 
inhibitory control demands and their relationship with externalizing proneness.  Although by 
name trait disinhibition encompasses behaviors characterized by a lack of inhibitory control, 
research on stop signal task performance, a cognitive control task that assesses behavioral 
inhibitory control, finds no significant associations with overall trait impulsiveness; instead, 
only the motor impulsiveness subscale correlates with poorer stop signal task inhibitory 
control (Enticott, Ogloff, & Bradshaw, 2006; Shen, Lee, & Chen, 2014).  In contrast, a 
considerable amount of work has shown that substance abuse is associated with poorer 
inhibitory control on the stop signal task (e.g., Ersche et al., 2011; Goudriaan et al., 2005; Li 
et al., 2006; Monterosso et al., 2005; Moreno et al., 2012).  The purpose of Study 4 was to 
determine how inhibitory control is affected by reward valuation by providing an immediate 
reward for correct inhibition. 
8 
2. STUDY 1: REWARD WANTING AND LEARNING
Study 1
1
 was designed to assess the influences of general externalizing proneness and
its specific manifestation in the form of substance abuse on reward learning and behavioral 
choices, and the role of variations in striatal dopamine levels (as indexed by spontaneous 
eyeblink rate) in moderating this relationship.  Previous research shows that substance abuse 
is related to poorer associative learning on the Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara, 2003; Bechara 
& Damasio, 2002).  In contrast, however, superior associative learning for drug stimuli and 
reward outcomes is a proposed mechanism for transitioning from recreational drug use to 
addiction (Hogarth, Balleine, Corbit, & Killcross, 2013).  Thus, the current research on the 
relationship between substance abuse and reward learning appears mixed.  
Because tonic dopamine encodes the average reward rate, while phasic dopamine 
encodes reward prediction errors (Ljungberg et al., 1992; Niv et al., 2007; Schultz, 1998; 
Waelti et al., 2001), dopamine may interact with substance abuse to affect reward-based 
associative learning.  In particular, elevated tonic dopamine levels may enhance learning of 
the long-term average rewards associated with each reward option.  Low tonic dopamine 
levels may lead to larger phasic spikes in response to reward prediction errors, and thus 
enhanced associations of the immediate action-reward contingencies (Daw, 2003; Niv et al., 
2007).  Thus, high tonic dopamine levels may operate to enhance updating of reward values 
and thereby facilitate learning of the long-term average reward rates of differing options. In 
contrast, low tonic dopamine may result in poorer associative learning due to over-reliance 
on immediate action-reward contingencies at the expense of long-term action-reward 
contingencies. 
1 *Reprinted with permission from “Striatal Dopamine, Externalizing Proneness, and Substance Abuse Effects
on Wanting and Learning during Reward-Based Decision-Making” by K. A. Byrne, C. J. Patrick, and D. A. 
Worthy, 2016. Clinical Psych Science, 4, 760-774. Copyright 2016 by SAGE Publishing. 
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Given that nonplanful impulsivity is associated with enhanced preference for 
immediate rewards, trait disinhibition appears to be associated with increased reward 
wanting.  Based on this limited research, I predicted that individuals with more disinhibitory 
tendencies and low tonic dopamine levels (larger phasic spikes in response to reward stimuli) 
would show enhanced reward wanting preferences.  
For all studies, a power analysis was conducted using G*Power to determine the 
appropriate sample size.  The results revealed that a sample of 91 would be needed to have 
80% power and a medium effect size to detect an effect with a regression with five predictors 
(eyeblink rate index of striatal dopamine, Disinhibition, Substance Abuse, EBR X 
Disinhibition, and EBR X Substance Abuse); thus, a sample size of at least 91 participants 
was obtained for each study.  
2.1 Participants 
A total of 93 undergraduate students (48 females; age range = 18–22) completed the 
delay discounting task for partial course credit in their introduction to psychology course. Of 
these, 67 (36 females) also performed the reward learning task. 
2.2 Materials and Design  
Externalizing Spectrum Inventory–Brief Form.  To assess disinhibitory/externalizing 
tendencies, I administered the Disinhibition and Substance Abuse subscales from the 
Externalizing Spectrum Inventory–Brief Form (ESI-BF; Patrick et al., 2013). The 
Disinhibition subscale consisted of 20 items that assess general externalizing proneness (i.e., 
proclivities toward reckless-impulsive behavior, and affiliated traits; Krueger et al., 2007), 
and includes questions about problematic impulsivity, irresponsibility, theft, impatient 
urgency, fraud, alienation, planful control, and boredom proneness. The Substance Abuse 
subscale contained 18 items pertaining to use of and problems with alcohol and other drugs. 
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For each scale, item responses were made using a 4-point Likert-type scale (true, somewhat 
true, somewhat false, or false). Both the Disinhibition and Substance Abuse subscales show 
strong validity in relation to relevant criterion measures (Patrick & Drislane, 2015; Venables 
& Patrick, 2012), and both exhibited very high internal consistency within the current sample 
(αs = .94 and .95). It is important that the ESI-BF Disinhibition scale is a measure of an 
individual’s general proclivity for externalizing problems, whereas the ESI-BF Substance 
Abuse scale indexes a distinct manifestation of this broad disinhibitory liability—namely, 
problematic use of alcohol/drugs. 
Spontaneous Eyeblink Rate (Tonic Dopamine Index). Spontaneous eyeblink rate 
(EBR) was used as an index of striatal tonic dopamine (Karson, 1983). Specifically, previous 
research demonstrates that faster spontaneous EBR is indicative of elevated dopamine levels 
in the striatum (Colzato, Slagter, van den Wildenberg, & Hommel, 2009; Karson, 1983; 
Taylor et al., 1999).  More recently, spontaneous eyeblink rate has been shown to have a 
strong correlation with dopamine D2 receptor density, which mediates tonic dopamine levels, 
in the ventral striatum and caudate nucleus (Groman et al., 2014; Slagter et al., 2015). 
Following previous published research (e.g., Chermahini & Hommel, 2010; Colzato 
et  al., 2009; De Jong & Merckelbach, 1990; Ladas, Frantzidis, Bamidis, & Vivas, 2013), I 
used electrooculogram (EOG) recording to assess spontaneous EBR as an indirect index of 
available levels of tonic dopamine in the striatum. To record EBR, I followed the procedure 
described by Fairclough and Venables (2006), in which vertical eyeblink activity was 
recorded from Ag/AgCl electrodes positioned above and below the left eye, with a ground 
electrode placed on the center of the forehead. All EOG signals were filtered (at 0.01–10 Hz) 
and amplified using a Biopac EOG100C differential corneal–retinal potential amplifier. 
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Eyeblinks were defined as phasic increases in EOG activity of >100 µV and occurring within 
intervals of 400 ms or less over the recording interval. Eyeblink frequency was quantified 
using manual count. All recordings were collected during daytime hours of 11 a.m. to 4 p.m. 
because previous work has shown that diurnal fluctuations in spontaneous EBR can occur in 
the evening hours (Barbato et al., 2000). A black fixation cross (“X”) was displayed on a 
wall at eye level 1 m from where the participant was seated. Participants were instructed to 
look in the direction of the fixation cross for the duration of the recording and avoid moving 
or turning their head. Eyeblinks were recorded for 6 min under this basic resting condition. 
Each participant’s EBR was determined by computing the average number of blinks across 
the 6-min recording interval. 
Reward Wanting.  The delay discounting task (Richards, Zhang, Mitchell, & Wit, 
1999) was utilized to assess reward-related wanting.  Within the Research Domain Criteria 
(RDoC) framework (Cuthbert & Kozak, 2013), delay discounting is an experimental 
paradigm that relates to the approach motivation construct under the Positive Valence 
Systems domain. Previous research indicates that the RDoC approach motivation construct 
corresponds to physiological reward wanting (Baskin-Sommers & Foti, 2015). In the delay 
discounting task, participants indicated whether they would prefer a smaller amount of 
money immediately or a larger amount of money after a time delay (e.g., “Would you prefer 
$2 now or $10 after 30 days?”). A preference for immediate reward indicated greater 
disregard for (discounting of) the delayed reward option and, by inference, a higher degree of 
“wanting” for immediate reward. The dependent measure was the area under the curve; lower 
values indicate greater discounting of future rewards and thus enhanced reward wanting.  
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Reward Learning.  To examine reward learning, I utilized a complex reinforcement-
learning (RL) task, a type of paradigm enumerated under the RDoC reward learning 
construct. This task involves a choice-history-dependent reward structure and has been used 
extensively in previous research to investigate learning of immediate and delayed reward 
outcomes (Cooper et al., 2014; Worthy, Byrne, & Fields, 2014; Worthy, Cooper, Byrne, 
Gorlick, & Maddox, 2014; Worthy, Gorlick, Pacheco, Schnyer, & Maddox, 2011; Worthy, 
Otto, & Maddox, 2012). In the task, participants repeatedly chose between two options to 
learn which option led to the best outcome. One option, the Increasing option, offered fewer 
points on each trial compared with the second option, but rewards for both options increased 
over time as it was selected more frequently. The second option, the Decreasing option, 
offered more points on each trial but as this alternative was chosen more often, rewards for 
both options decreased in value. Thus, participants needed to choose between both options to 
learn that the Increasing option was advantageous because it offered more points in the long-
run. The dependent measure was the proportion of trials that individuals selection the optimal 
Increasing option.  
2.3 Procedure 
Participants began the study by completing demographic questionnaires (age, gender, 
and the number of hours slept the previous night) and the ESI-BF Disinhibition and 
Substance Abuse subscales followed by 100 trials of the reward learning task. Participants 
were given a goal of earning at least 7,200 points on the task, which would require them to 
select the optimal Increasing option on more than 60% of the trials. After the reward learning 
task, participants completed the delay discounting task. The session ended with a 6-min 
assessment of EBR.  Then, participants were debriefed about the nature of the study. 
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2.4 Data Analysis 
To evaluate my first hypothesis regarding the association between the EBR index of 
striatal dopamine and the individual differences and performance measures, bivariate 
correlations were conducted. I anticipated that negative correlations would be observed 
between delay discounting reward preference and the EBR index as well as between ESI-BF 
Disinhibition and the EBR index, whereas a positive relationship between reward learning 
performance and EBR was expected.  
To test my other two hypotheses pertaining to the interaction between the EBR index 
of striatal dopamine and externalizing tendencies, separate hierarchical regression analyses 
were conducted for the delay discounting and reward learning tasks. These analyses provided 
for evaluation of the separate and interactive effects of continuous variations in externalizing 
tendencies and dopamine levels on decision making. Gender, age, and hours slept were 
included as covariates in both regression analyses to control for possible effects of these 
variables. Thus, the predictors for both delay discounting (“reward wanting”) and reward 
learning regressions were identical. Results from the delay discounting preferences reward 
learning regressions were used to assess for effects of externalizing proneness and its 
interaction with striatal dopamine on reward wanting and learning, respectively. 
2.5 Results and Discussion 
Descriptive Statistics. Examination of the spontaneous EBR results revealed that one 
participant’s data was excluded because EBR in this case was more than three standard 
deviation units above the mean and thus represented an outlier. After this exclusion, 
individual EBRs ranged from 4.33 to 38.83 blinks/min (M = 17.31, SD = 8.81). Scores on the 
ESI-BF Disinhibition subscale ranged from 0 to 51 (M = 15.39, SD = 13.60) and the range of 
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scores on the ESI-BF Substance Abuse subscale ranged from 0 to 34 (M = 13.36, SD = 7.46). 
No outliers were observed in responses to the ESI-BF subscales.  
Correlational Analyses. Bivariate correlations (rs) were computed between each of 
the measures collected (i.e., EBR index of striatal dopamine and Substance Abuse and 
Disinhibition scales of the ESI-BF) and performance on the delay discounting task and the 
reward learning task (Table 1). ESI-BF Disinhibition and Substance Abuse scores were 
positively correlated as expected with one another (cf. Patrick et al., 2013), r = .46, p < .01. 
Substance Abuse scores, and to a lesser extent Disinhibition scores, showed negative 
associations with the EBR index of tonic dopamine level, although these correlations were 
also nonsignificant. 
Regression Analysis for Reward Wanting Task. A three-step hierarchical multiple 
regression analysis was conducted to examine the effect of disinhibition, substance abuse, 
and striatal dopamine, as measured by eyeblink rate, on delay discounting performance.  In 
the first step, gender, age, and hours slept were entered as covariates. Omnibus prediction at 
this step of the model was marginally significant, F(3, 88) = 2.42, p = .07.  Gender did not 
emerge as a significant predictor at this step (p=.52), but hours slept showed a significant 
relationship (β = .23, p = .03), indicating that sleep was associated with less discounting of 
delayed rewards, and age showed a marginally significant predictive association, β = .17, p 
=.10.  In the second step of the model, disinhibition, substance abuse, and striatal dopamine 
(as indexed by EBR) were entered to evaluate their independent predictive associations with 
delay discounting.  The model as a whole was not significant at this step (p =.56), and none 
of the predictors evidenced an independent association with delay discounting preferences, ps 
>.30.  In the third step of the model, interaction terms for striatal dopamine by disinhibition 
 
 
15 
 
and striatal dopamine by substance abuse were entered as predictors.  The addition of these 
terms accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in delay discounting, ΔR2 = .06, 
F(8, 83) = 3.19,  p<.05.  At this step of the model, the Striatal Dopamine X Disinhibition 
interaction (β = .29, p = .01) contributed significantly to prediction of delay discounting 
choices, whereas striatal dopamine (p = .91), disinhibition (p = .18), substance abuse (p = 
.84) and the Striatal Dopamine X Substance Abuse interaction (p = .69) were not predictive 
of delay discounting preferences.  
Next, simple regression lines for the effect of disinhibition on delay discounting at (a) 
the mean for striatal dopamine, (b) one standard deviation above the mean for striatal 
dopamine, and (c) one standard deviation below the mean striatal dopamine were performed.  
Striatal dopamine, disinhibition, and substance abuse variables were centered prior to 
creating the centered interaction terms. The simple regression slope coefficients when 
centered at the mean (β = -.17, p = .18) and one standard deviation above the mean (β = .09, 
p = .54) were not significant, but the simple regression slope coefficient for one standard 
deviation below the mean significantly predicted delay discounting, β = -.43, p =.02, such 
that at low levels of striatal dopamine individuals higher in disinhibition tended to discount 
future rewards at a greater rate.  This result suggests that the impact of increasing 
disinhibition on delay discounting performance varied as a function of tonic dopamine level 
as indexed by EBR, such that high-disinhibited individuals with low tonic dopamine showed 
the most aberrant delay discounting performance, and thus the strongest reward wanting 
preferences. 
Regression Analysis for Reward Learning Task.  The same predictors used in the 
analysis of delay discounting were entered across three steps of a counterpart regression 
 
 
16 
 
model for reward learning task performance, operationalized as the average proportion of 
Increasing optimal option selections on the task.  Omnibus prediction at step 1 of the model, 
at which gender, age, and hours slept were added, was significant, F(3,64) = 6.05, p < .01, 
with gender (β = .46, p < .01) but not age (p = .63) or hours slept (p = .30) emerging as 
distinctly predictive of reward learning performance.  Consistent with previous research 
(Byrne & Worthy, 2015), males selected the optimal option more frequently than females.  
The increase in overall prediction was not significant at step 2 of the model (ΔR2 =.01, F(6, 
61) = 0.16, p = .92), in which disinhibition, substance abuse, and striatal dopamine were 
included as predictors, but none of these variables accounted uniquely for variance in reward 
learning performance, all ps >.50.  In the last step of the model, interaction terms for striatal 
dopamine by disinhibition and striatal dopamine by substance abuse were entered.  A 
significant increase in overall prediction was again evident (ΔR2 = .13, F(8, 59) = 5.76, p < 
.01), in this case with the Striatal Dopamine X Substance Abuse interaction effect (β = .41, p 
< .01) showing unique predictive associations.  The effect of striatal dopamine on reward 
learning performance was marginally significant (β = .23, p = .07), whereas substance abuse 
(p = .63), disinhibition (p = .23), and the Striatal Dopamine X Disinhibition interaction (p = 
.59) contributed negligibly. Based on the relationship between EBR and substance abuse, 
evidence from the regression analysis suggests that heightened striatal dopamine moderates 
reward learning in high-substance abuse individuals, leading to enhanced performance.  
Simple regression lines for the association of substance abuse with reward learning 
performance at (a) the mean for striatal dopamine, (b) one standard deviation above the mean 
for striatal dopamine, and (c) one standard deviation below the mean for striatal dopamine 
were also conducted.  As with the delay discounting analysis, predictor variables were 
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centered before the interaction terms were created.  The simple regression slope coefficient 
for the mean (β = .07, p = .63) was not significant, but the slope coefficients for one standard 
deviation above (β = .54, p = .02) and below (β = -.41, p =.04) the mean significantly 
predicted reward learning performance.  
 Discussion. These results provide evidence that baseline tonic dopamine levels 
moderate the effects of disinhibition and substance abuse on reward processing. Specifically, 
in the delay discounting task that assessed reward wanting, disinhibitory tendencies were 
associated with stronger preferences for immediate reward only for individuals with lower 
tonic dopamine levels. At moderate and high levels of tonic dopamine we observed no 
relationship between disinhibition and preferences for immediate versus delayed reward.  A 
potential implication of this result is that high-disinhibited individuals with low striatal tonic 
dopamine may compose a maximum-liability group.  There was no effect of substance abuse 
in this task.  
In contrast, for reward learning, a crossover interaction between tonic dopamine and 
substance abuse was observed. At higher tonic dopamine levels, substance abuse was 
associated with enhanced reward learning. At lower tonic dopamine levels, an opposing 
inverse relationship between substance use and reward learning was evident, reflecting 
comparatively poorer performance for individuals reporting higher levels of substance use. 
These results suggest that learning of long-term action-reward contingencies depends on 
tonic dopamine levels in substance abusers. The implication could be that higher levels of 
tonic dopamine might facilitate improved reward learning in individuals with high levels of 
substance use. Alternatively, alcohol or drug users with high tonic dopamine levels may be 
strategically reward-oriented rather than impulsively driven by immediate desires.  Thus, a 
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dissociative effect of disinhibition and substance abuse was found for reward wanting and 
learning, and these effects depended on striatal tonic dopamine levels. 
This study is the first to demonstrate that disinhibition and substance abuse exert 
different effects on reward processing, depending on variations in striatal tonic dopamine 
levels. Specifically, these results provide support for the hypothesis that these distinct 
components of externalizing behavior are differentially related to reward wanting and 
learning. I conclude that externalizing problems may reflect either an enhanced desire for 
rewards or augmented associative linking of reward stimuli to their outcomes. Although 
associative learning regarding reward values and reward predictors may initially be 
beneficial, it can lead to negative consequences, such as addiction, in certain disposed 
individuals across time. 
Accelerated reinforcement learning of reward options may be beneficial in some 
situations, such as academics and career goals. However, when the reward is a harmful, like a 
drug, increased tonic dopamine may still promote learning of action-reward contingencies 
and lead to difficulty in reward disengagement (Dagher & Robbins, 2009). Therefore, Study 
2 was designed to assess the long-term consequences of how baseline dopamine levels 
interact with substance abuse and disinhibition.  To address this issue, Study 2 used a 
devaluation paradigm to gauge reward disengagement after reward learning has occurred. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
3. STUDY 2: HABIT LEARNING AND DEVALUATION 
The purpose of Study 2 was to follow up on the reward learning results from Study 1 
and determine whether striatal dopamine enhances both reward learning and disengagement, 
or devaluation, of action-reward contingencies, or if its effects are specific to reward learning 
in individuals with substance abuse problems. While numerous studies demonstrate that 
substance abuse is associated with increased perseveration on reversal learning tasks and the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting task, research on substance abuse and disengagement from 
previously reinforced behaviors in humans is very limited (Ersche et al., 2008; Fontes et al., 
2011; Hoff et al., 1996; Madoz-Gurpide et al., 2011; Woicik et al., 2009). One possible 
prediction is that similar interactions between striatal dopamine and substance abuse that are 
expected for reward learning would also be observed for reward disengagement as measured 
by devaluation sensitivity.  Specifically, at high levels of tonic dopamine individuals with 
substance abuse problems may show better reward learning and disengagement. This 
outcome would demonstrate that striatal dopamine is a protective factor of addiction—
individuals may use substances recreationally without becoming addicted to them because 
they can easily disengage from those reward associations.  Alternatively, once striatal 
dopamine facilitates the association between an option and its reward, disengaging from 
those associations may no longer be dopamine-dependent; thus, regardless of dopamine 
levels, once reward associations are well-learned and become habit-based, individuals with 
substance abuse problems may struggle to disengage from the learned strategy.  Because 
work on disinhibition and devaluation has not been investigated to my knowledge, analyses 
for disinhibition were exploratory.   
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3.1 Participants 
Ninety-one undergraduate students (61 females; age range 18 - 22) completed the 
study for partial course credit in their introduction to psychology course.  
3.2 Materials and Design 
Externalizing Spectrum Inventory–Brief Form.  As with Study 1, the ESI-BF was 
used to measure disinhibition and substance abuse.  
Spontaneous Eyeblink Rate (Tonic Dopamine Index). Spontaneous EBR was used as 
an index of striatal tonic dopamine. The same procedure that was described in Study 1 was 
followed for Study 2 to measure EBR. 
Two-Stage Reinforcement Learning Devaluation Task. In order to test the effect of 
substance abuse on both reward learning and disengagement, a two-stage reinforcement 
learning task in combination with a devaluation procedure (Gillan, Otto, Phelps, & Daw, 
2015) was utilized.  During the reinforcement learning phase, participants completed two 
concurrent two-stage reinforcement learning tasks that were structurally equivalent, but had 
unique stimuli and rewards that were recorded separately.  In this task, individuals gain 
experience with two situations (“states”) and reward outcomes in order base future decisions 
on (Gläscher et al., 2010). These states were indicated by two difference trial types: gold 
trials and silver trials. On the first stage of each trial, individuals choose between two 
options, each of which has a distinct probability of transitioning to a unique second state 
stimulus (a point box; Figure 3).  Stimuli in the second state then either provide a reward in 
the form of points or provide no reward.  Each first-stage option has a 70% chance of leading 
to a “common” second-stage state and a 30% chance of leading to a “rare” second-stage 
state.  The probability that the point boxes in the second stage contained a reward varied 
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across the task based on independent Gaussian random walks (SD=.025) with a minimum 
probability of 25% and maximum probability of 75%.  Rewards were portrayed in points 
such the point boxes contained either 0 (unrewarded) or 100 (rewarded) points. After the 
second stage, the amount of points earned was stored in a gold (gold trial type) or silver 
(silver trial type) container. The cumulative amount earned was displayed throughout the 
reinforcement learning phase. For each trial, choosing an option in the first step cost 5 points.  
Thus, if the point box led to 0 points, then there was a net loss of 5 points for that trial and 
the 5 points were deducted from the cumulative total.  If the point box yielded 100 points, 
then there was a net gain of 95 points that were added to the cumulative total.  The optimal 
strategy in this phase was to learn which first-stage options yielded common point boxes in 
the second stage for each trial type and choose those options.  
 In the devaluation phase, participants were informed that one of their point containers 
(i.e., gold) was full, and that they would no longer be able to store points in that container.  
Even if the point box contained 100 points, participants were informed that the points would 
not be deposited in the container, and they would only be charged the 5 points for that trial. 
The other point container (i.e., silver) still had room, and they could still keep points for 
those trial types. Thus, the trial type where the container was full (i.e., gold) became 
devalued. The optimal strategy was to respond the same way in this phase as the 
reinforcement learning phase for the valued trial type that still has room (i.e, silver), and 
choose not to respond for the devalued trial type where the container was full (i.e., gold).   
The dependent measure as devaluation sensitivity which was computed by subtracting the 
number of devalued trials that participants responded on from the number of valued trials that 
participants responded on. A model-based and model-free metric was also computed based 
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on whether participants stayed or switched following a rewarded or unrewarded trial (model-
free) and whether the option on the current trial led to a common or rare box (model-based). 
3.3 Procedure 
Participants first completed a 6-min assessment of EBR.  They then completed 
demographic questionnaires (age, gender, and the number of hours slept the previous night), 
the ESI-BF Disinhibition and Substance Abuse subscales.  Next, participants completed 200 
trials of the reinforcement learning phase of the two-stage reinforcement learning devaluation 
task followed by 50 trials of the devaluation phase.  Following the conclusion of these 
procedures, participants were debriefed about the study. 
3.4 Data Analysis 
In order to assess individual differences in model-free and model-based behavior 
during the reinforcement learning task, model-based and model-free metrics were computed.  
A mixed-effects logistic regression analysis for Reward (Rewarded vs. Unrewarded) X 
Transition type (Common vs. Rare) predicting stay probability was performed using the lme4 
module of the R statistical package, version 3.0.1. Trial types (silver coded as 0, gold coded 
as 1) were computed independently in the analysis such that reward and common/rare states 
pertained to the previous outcomes for that trial type.  For instance, for a trial in which 
participants selected an option on a gold trial type, the reward and common/rare outcome 
variables were computed based on the trial preceding that trial type.  Reward, second state 
outcome (common or rare), their interaction, and participants were included as random 
effects. The specific syntax for the mixed-effects logistic regression was: Stay ~ 
Reward*Transition + (1 + Reward*Transition | Participant).  From this analysis, individual 
beta weights were retrieved.  The betas from the Reward variable were used as the model-
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free metric, and the betas from the Reward X Transition type interaction were designated as 
the model-based metric.  
To evaluate my first hypothesis regarding the association between the individual 
differences and performance measures (devaluation sensitivity, model-based index, and 
model-free index), correlations were computed. I predicted that a negative correlation would 
be observed between substance abuse and the devaluation sensitivity measure, whereas a 
positive correlation would be observed between substance abuse and the model-free index.  
In addition, two other regression analyses were conducted for this measure to test whether 
striatal dopamine interacts with substance abuse to influence devaluation sensitivity and 
model-free behavior.   
Next, to assess relationships between substance abuse and model-based behavior, I 
performed regression analyses for this outcome that (1) tested the prediction that substance 
abuse would negatively predict model-based learning, and (2) explored the possibility that 
substance abuse interacts with striatal dopamine to influence model-based strategies. These 
analyses allowed for testing the separate and interactive effects of continuous variations in 
externalizing tendencies and dopamine levels on devaluation and model-free behavior. Given 
the lack of a priori predictions for trait disinhibition, I conducted both full and reduced model 
analyses for each outcome measure.  The predictors in the full model included striatal 
dopamine (as indexed by EBR), substance abuse, disinhibition, the striatal dopamine X 
substance abuse interaction term, and the striatal dopamine X disinhibition interaction term.  
The reduced model predictors consisted of striatal dopamine (as indexed by EBR), substance 
abuse, and their interaction term. 
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3.5 Results and Discussion 
Descriptive Statistics. Individual EBRs ranged from 4.17 to 40.17 blinks/min (M = 
15.63, SD = 7.28). Scores on the ESI-BF Disinhibition subscale ranged from 0 to 46 (M = 
12.21, SD = 7.71) and the range of scores on the ESI-BF Substance Abuse subscale ranged 
from 0 to 45 (M = 14.02, SD = 12.27). 
Correlational Analyses. Correlations were computed between the independent 
measures (EBR index of striatal dopamine, ESI-BF Substance Abuse, and ESI-BF 
Disinhibition) and the outcomes measures (devaluation sensitivity index, model-free index, 
and the model-based index). Table 2 shows correlations between all variables. ESI-BF 
Disinhibition and Substance abuse subscales were positively correlated as expected (cf. 
Patrick et al., 2013), r = .49, p < .01.  As predicted, substance abuse was negatively 
correlated with devaluation sensitivity, r = -.24, p < .05 (Figure 4).  Disinhibition was not 
significantly correlated with any of the outcome measures.  However, the EBR index showed 
a significant negative correlation with devaluation sensitivity (r = -.21, p = .04).  None of the 
demographics variables (gender, age, sleep) were associated with devaluation sensitivity (ps 
> .40). 
Regression Analysis for Devaluation Sensitivity. A hierarchical regression analysis 
was conducted to examine the effect of Substance Abuse, Disinhibition, and striatal 
dopamine (as indexed by EBR) on devaluation sensitivity.  In the first step, the first-order 
terms (substance abuse, disinhibition, and striatal dopamine) were entered in the model.  
Omnibus prediction at this step of the model was significant, R
2 
= .11, F(3, 82) =  3.41, p = 
.02.  Substance abuse was a significant predictor of devaluation sensitivity, β = -.31, p = .01.  
Disinhibition was also significant (β = .26, p = .03), but striatal dopamine was a 
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nonsignificant predictor at this step, ps > .10. In the second step of the model, striatal 
dopamine X substance abuse and striatal dopamine X disinhibition interaction terms were 
entered in the model.  The omnibus prediction at this step approached significance, ∆R2 = .02, 
F(5,80) = 2.06, p = .08, but none of the individual predictors emerged as significant, p > .10.   
I also examined results for a reduced model including substance abuse, striatal 
dopamine, and their interaction term as predictors of devaluation sensitivity.
2
  In the first step 
of the model, substance abuse was a marginally significant predictor, β = -.18, p = .09, while 
EBR was nonsignificant, p >.10.  However, the omnibus prediction at the step was 
nonsignificant, p = .11.  Similarly, when the interaction term was entered in the second step 
of the model, the omnibus test and the predictors were nonsignificant, p > .10. The reduced 
model with disinhibition, striatal dopamine, and the substance abuse X striatal dopamine 
interaction did not reveal any significant effects, ps > .15.   
Regression Analysis for the Model-Free Index. A parallel set of regression analyses 
was used to test for effects of the predictor variables on model-free behavior.  In the first step 
of the model, none of the first-order predictors were significantly associated with the model-
free index (ps > .07), and the omnibus test was nonsignificant, p = .26.  In the second step of 
the model when the interaction terms were added to the model, the omnibus test was 
significant, ΔR2 = .08, F(5,79) = 2.33, p = .05.  Substance abuse (β = -1.04, p < .01) and the 
striatal dopamine X substance abuse interaction term (β = 1.08, p < .01) were significant 
predictors of model-free behavior during the reinforcement learning phase.  While 
                                                          
2
 I also conducted logistic regression analyses for the data in Study 2 as the distribution for devaluation 
sensitivity was relatively bimodal.  For the full model, substance abuse was significantly related to devaluation 
sensitivity in the first step of the model (β = -.26, p = .04), although the omnibus test was nonsignificant, F(3, 
80) = 1.76, p = .16. The interaction terms were not significant in the second step of the full model, ps > .20.  
However, in the reduced model in which substance abuse, striatal dopamine, and their interaction term were 
included as predictors of devaluation sensitivity (dichotomized), substance abuse (β = -.17, p = .12) did not 
reach significance.  
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disinhibition was a marginally significant predictor (β = .55, p = .09), EBR and the striatal 
dopamine X disinhibition interaction were nonsignificant predictors, p > .30.  Thus, as with 
the devaluation sensitivity regression analysis, a reduced model with substance abuse, striatal 
dopamine and their interaction terms was also performed.   
As in the full model, neither substance abuse nor striatal dopamine predicted 
significantly in the first step of this reduced model, and the omnibus prediction coefficient 
was nonsignificant, ps > .20.  In the second step of the model, however, substance abuse (β = 
-.71, p < .05) and the striatal dopamine X substance abuse interaction (β = .82, p < .05) 
emerged as significant predictors.  The omnibus test was nonsignificant, however, ΔR2 = .06, 
F(3,81) = 2.02, p = .12. 
Figure 5 shows simple regression lines for the effect of substance abuse scores on 
model-free choices at (a) the mean for striatal dopamine, (b) one standard deviation above 
the mean for striatal dopamine, and (c) one standard deviation below the mean for striatal 
dopamine. Striatal dopamine and substance abuse variables were centered prior to creating 
the centered interaction terms. The simple regression slope coefficients when centered at the 
mean (β = -.09, p = .48) and at one standard deviation below the mean (β = .36, p = .09) were 
not significant, but the simple regression slope coefficient centered at one standard deviation 
above the mean significantly predicted model-free behavior, β = -.53, p < .01. At high levels 
of striatal dopamine, individuals with higher substance abuse tendencies tended to rely less 
on model-free strategies during the reinforcement learning phase of the task. This result 
suggests that the effect of increasing levels of substance abuse on model-free strategies 
varied as a function of tonic dopamine levels such that individuals reporting high levels of 
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substance abuse with high striatal tonic dopamine showed the least reliance on strategies that 
depended on recent reward outcomes. 
 The reduced model with disinhibition, striatal dopamine, and the disinhibition X 
striatal dopamine interaction revealed no significant main effects, and the interaction was not 
significant, ps > .10.  
Regression Analysis for the Model-Based Index. The same full and reduced model 
analyses were conducted for the model-based index as the devaluation sensitivity and model-
free index.  All predictors in the first step of the model and the omnibus test were 
nonsignificant, p > .10.  Similarly, in the second step of the model, none of the other 
predictors or the omnibus test were significant, ps > .30.  Although reduced models were also 
performed, they did not reveal any significant effects in either the first or second step of the 
model, ps > .30.   
Discussion. The results of Study 2 demonstrate that substance abuse, independent of 
striatal dopamine, is negatively associated with devaluation sensitivity, or reward 
disengagement.  Furthermore, the effect of substance abuse on model-free reinforcement 
learning depends on striatal tonic dopamine.  Specifically, individuals with substance abuse 
problems and high levels of striatal tonic dopamine were less reliant on model-free strategies.  
This result is in line with the results of Study 1 that showed that at high levels of striatal 
dopamine, substance abuse is positively associated with reward learning on a task in which 
model-free strategies are counterproductive.  Thus, the consistency of these findings across 
different tasks in Study 1 and 2 suggests that high levels of striatal tonic dopamine may be a 
protective factor against reliance on automatic, reward-driven strategies in individuals with 
substance use problems.  
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Striatal dopamine therefore appears to influence reward salience during reinforcement 
learning in the contexts of extended learning. These data suggest that once reward-outcome 
associations are well learned, individuals with substance abuse problems—regardless of 
variation in striatal tonic dopamine levels—have difficulty disengaging from habitual 
responding.  While these results suggest that the effects of striatal tonic dopamine influence 
reward learning, striatal dopamine does not appear to moderate the effects of substance abuse 
on devaluation, or reward disengagement.   
Moreover, as predicted, trait disinhibition was not associated with reward learning 
strategies or devaluation sensitivity in either experiment.  These findings are in line with the 
results of Study 1 that showed that substance abuse and disinhibition exert distinct effects on 
reward processing depending on individual differences in striatal dopamine levels: Substance 
abuse is more strongly linked with reward learning, whereas disinhibition is associated more 
with reward wanting. 
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4. STUDY 3: EFFORT-BASED DECISION-MAKING (EFFORT VALUATION) 
 
Like Study 2, Study 3 was also intended to be a follow-up on the results of Study 1.  
Because low tonic dopamine levels are predicted to enhance reward wanting in individuals 
with more disinhibitory tendencies, striatal dopamine may also interact with disinhibition to 
influence physical and/or cognitive effort-based decision-making. To address this issue, 
Study 3 examines the interaction between externalizing proneness and striatal dopamine on 
both physical and cognitive effort expenditure for rewards. 
While physical effort expenditure in humans has been widely studied using the Effort 
Expenditure for Rewards Task (EEfRT), methods for assessing cognitive effort are more 
nuanced.  Current designs to test cognitive effort include choosing different levels of the N-
back working memory test for easy (i.e., 1-back) versus difficult (i.e., 3-back) selections 
(Culbreth, Westbrook, & Barch, 2016; Westbrook et al., 2013) and choosing easy versus 
difficult math problems (Vassena et al., 2014). However, these designs risk confounds with 
working memory capacity and math ability.  The present study was designed to address these 
confounds in two ways.  First, I included a measure of working memory capacity in order to 
account for individual differences in cognitive resources.  Secondly, the task utilized a novel 
category learning paradigm in which individuals chose to categorize a small number of 
stimuli (easy task) or a larger number of stimuli (difficult task) on each trial.  I hypothesized 
that good performance in this task would rely less heavily on working memory than current 
cognitive effort methods.  Including both physical and cognitive effort tasks allowed for 
determining the generalizability of effort effects across domains.  
Previous research suggests that reward wanting and willingness to exert effort in 
order to receive a reward is mediated by dopamine signaling in the ventral striatum (Berridge 
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& Robinson, 1998; Correa, Carlson, Wisniecki, & Salamone, 2002; Salamone, Correa, 
Farrar, & Mingote, 2007).  Despite reward wanting (reward valuation) and effort-based 
decision-making (effort valuation) defined as distinct constructs in the RDoC matrix, this 
finding in the animal literature suggests that effort-based decision-making may be closely 
related to reward wanting.  Animal research suggests that high D2 receptor signaling (high 
tonic dopamine) in the ventral striatum enhances willingness to exert effort for larger 
rewards, while low D2 receptor signaling (low tonic dopamine) enhances preferences for less 
effortful, small rewards (Trifilieff et al., 2013; Trifilieff & Martinez, 2014).  In humans d-
amphetamine, which increases both tonic and phasic dopamine (Daberkow et al., 2013), 
enhances willingness to exert effort for rewards (Wardle et al., 2011).   Furthermore, in a 
recent review, phasic striatal dopamine has been proposed to encode reward prediction errors 
of task costs and benefits, while tonic dopamine may influence working memory 
maintenance while engaging in the task (Westbrook & Braver, 2015).  However, it is unclear 
how dopamine interacts with disinhibition and whether phasic or tonic dopamine levels drive 
willingness to exert effort for rewards in humans.  Given these findings, it is possible that 
individuals with more disinhibitory tendencies and high tonic dopamine levels may exert 
more effort for larger rewards, while more impulsive individuals with low tonic dopamine 
may prefer less effortful, smaller rewards. While there has been exceptionally little work 
aimed at examining the effect of drug use and effort expenditure for rewards (Saunders, 
Richard, & Janak, 2015), some work suggests that effort-related processes are critical to drug 
reinforcement (Salamone, Correa, Farrar, & Mingote, 2007).  However, given that Study 1 
demonstrated that in substance users, low striatal tonic dopamine was associated with 
increased learning of options that maximized immediate rewards, it is possible that they may 
 
 
31 
 
also be more willing to exert effort to attain those immediate rewards.  As a result, I 
predicted that an interaction between substance abuse and striatal dopamine, such that 
individuals with low tonic dopamine and high substance abuse tendencies would exert more 
effort to attain rewards. 
4.1 Participants 
One hundred and thirteen undergraduate participants (77 female, age range 18 – 24) 
completed the cognitive and physical effort tasks and received partial course credit for their 
introduction to psychology course. Due to experimenter error, three participants did not 
complete the physical effort task, two participants did not complete the cognitive effort task, 
and six participants did not complete the working memory measure (final N = 104). 
4.2 Materials and Design 
Externalizing Spectrum Inventory–Brief Form.  As with Studies 1 and 2, the ESI-BF 
was used to measure disinhibition and substance abuse.  
Spontaneous Eyeblink Rate (Tonic Dopamine Index). Spontaneous EBR was used as 
an index of striatal tonic dopamine. The same procedure that was described in Study 1 was 
followed for Study 3 to measure EBR. 
Physical Effort Expenditure for Rewards Task. In the physical effort expenditure for 
rewards task (EEfRT; Treadway et al., 2009), individuals chose between an easy (low effort) 
or difficult (high effort) task in order to try to receive a reward (Figure 6a). Thus, this task 
was designed to assess physical effort expenditure.  For each trial, participants were 
presented with the probability that they would receive the reward.  Probabilities of reward 
were either low (12%) medium (50%), or high (88%) on each trial. Then, they chose either 
the easy or difficult task.  The easy task always offered the chance to win $1.00.  The 
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difficult task offered a chance to win a value that varied between $1.25 and $4.25 on each 
trial.  For easy trials, participants needed to press the spacebar 30 times in seven seconds in 
order to successfully have a chance to win $1.00.  For difficult trials, participants needed to 
press the spacebar 100 times in 21 seconds to have a chance to win the reward offered for 
that trial.  Participants received feedback on whether or not they successfully completed the 
task, and then received additional feedback about whether they won the amount based on the 
probability shown at the beginning of the trial. At the end of the task, two of the win trials 
were randomly selected, and participants received the actual amount they won on those two 
trials. The dependent measure was the average proportion of difficult selections. 
Cognitive Effort Expenditure for Rewards Task.  In the cognitive effort task, 
participants completed a unidimensional rule-based category learning task.  Individuals 
needed to attend to a single stimulus dimension to learn the correct rule and use it to 
categorize each stimulus into one of two categories.  Stimuli were lines that varied in length 
and orientation. However, only of these dimensions was relevant to classify the stimuli. More 
specifically, only the length of the lines defined the category rule, so that short lines belonged 
in category 1 and long lines belonged in category 2.  Thus, participants needed to attend to 
length, but ignore orientation to correctly categorize the stimuli.  
Participants first completed a training phase comprised of 50 trials in which they 
learned the rule that differentiated each category.  During the training phase, participants 
viewed a stimulus, selected either category 1 (i.e., short lines) or 2 (i.e., long lines), and then 
received feedback on whether their categorization was correct or incorrect.  Next, a 50-trial 
test phase with the cognitive effort component was presented (Figure 6b).  The effort portion 
of the task was designed to closely mirror the physical effort task.  To manipulate cognitive 
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effort, participants were asked to choose between an easy (low effort) or difficult (high 
effort) task on each trial. Similar to the physical effort task, for each trial participants were 
presented with the probability that they would receive the reward.  Probabilities of reward 
were either low (12%) medium (50%), or high (88%) on each trial. The easy task always 
offered the chance to win $1.00.  On easy trials, participants were asked to categorize three 
stimuli in a row correctly within seven seconds in order to have an opportunity to earn the 
reward.  On difficult trials, participants were asked to categorize ten stimuli in a row 
correctly within 21 seconds in order to have a chance to earn a reward.  If individuals chose 
the easy task and successfully completed it, then they may receive $1, depending on the 
probability of reward.  If they successfully completed the difficult task, then they may 
receive an amount between $1.25 and $4.25.  Incorrect categorizations resulted in $0 earned.  
As with the physical EEfRT, at the end of the task, two of the win trials were randomly 
selected, and participants received the actual amount they won on those two trials. The 
dependent measure was the average proportion of difficult selections. 
Working Memory Capacity Assessment. To measure working memory capacity, the 
operation span (OSPAN) task was employed (Turner & Engle, 1989). Participants viewed a 
math problem (i.e., (2 * 5) + 4)) for two seconds, and then a new screen with a number (i.e., 
15) displayed.  Participants needed to respond whether the number on the screen correctly or 
incorrectly answered the math problem they previously viewed by responding “true” or 
“false”.  After making a response, participants received feedback and then a letter appeared.  
After 3 – 7 math problem and letter trials, participants were asked to recall the letters they 
viewed in order.  Participants were instructed to both maximize accuracy in letter recall 
performance and maintain a math accuracy score of at least 85%.  Thus, participants needed 
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to both correctly answer the math problems while also maintaining a string of letters in 
working memory.  The OSPAN contained 75 total trials.  Working memory capacity was 
computed as the sum of correctly recalled letter spans.    
4.3 Procedure 
 In this within-subjects design, participants began with a 6-min assessment of EBR.  
Next, they completed the physical and cognitive effort tasks in a counterbalanced order. The 
physical effort task entailed 50 effort trials, and the cognitive effort task included 50 training 
trials and 50 effort trials. Each task was designed to take 15 – 20 minutes so that they were 
approximately equivalent in terms of fatigue demands.  Upon completion of both effort tasks, 
participants completed the demographics questions, ESI-BF Disinhibition subscale, and 
Substance Abuse subscale, and then completed the OSPAN working memory assessment.  
This study was designed to take approximately 90 minutes total. Following completion of the 
study, participants received their monetary reward from both tasks and then were debriefed 
about the study. 
4.4 Data Analysis  
 As with Studies 1 and 2, correlations between the independent (EBR, substance 
abuse, disinhibition), and dependent measures (proportion of difficult selections for each 
task) were performed.  In this study, correlational analyses between the OSPAN working 
memory scores and the dependent measures were also conducted to determine if working 
memory should be included as a covariate in further analyses.  To test the hypothesis that 
striatal dopamine will interact with disinhibition to influence effort expenditure for rewards, 
separate regressions for each dependent measure were conducted with EBR, substance abuse, 
disinhibition and the EBR X substance abuse and EBR X disinhibition interactions as 
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predictors. Given the specific predictions for the EBR X disinhibition, a reduced model with 
just EBR, disinhibition, and EBR X disinhibition was also performed.  
4.5 Results and Discussion 
 Descriptive Statistics.  Individual EBRs ranged from 2.17 to 41.20 blinks/min (M = 
13.97, SD = 7.26). Scores on the ESI-BF Disinhibition subscale ranged from 0 to 39 (M = 
13.97, SD = 7.99) and the range of scores on the ESI-BF Substance Abuse subscale ranged 
from 0 to 45 (M = 15.95, SD = 12.97).  In the physical effort task, average proportions of 
difficult selections across the task ranged from 0.02 – 1.00 (M = .37, SD = .22).  In the 
cognitive effort task, average proportions of difficult selections ranged from 0.00 – 1.00 (M = 
.42, SD = .27).  Thus, overall rates of difficult selections between the physical and cognitive 
effort tasks were relatively comparable.  Although participants selected difficult task in the 
cognitive effort task numerically more than they did in the physical effort task, this 
difference was nonsignificant, t(107) = 1.63, p = .11. 
 Order Effects. An independent samples t-test was conducted to determine whether 
order effects due to counterbalancing influenced physical or cognitive effort expenditure for 
rewards.  The t-test for physical effort showed a marginally significant effect of order.  
Individuals who completed the physical effort task first (M = .42, SD = .24) selected more 
difficult selections in the physical effort task than those that completed the cognitive effort 
task first (M = .33, SD = .42, SD = .20), t(108) = 2.01, p = .047.  In contrast, there was no 
significant order effects of the cognitive effort task, t(109) = -1.27, p =.21. Thus, order was 
included as a covariate in subsequent regression analyses. 
 Correlational Analyses. Correlations were computed between the independent 
measures (EBR index of striatal dopamine, ESI-BF Substance Abuse, and ESI-BF 
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Disinhibition) and the outcomes measures (average difficult selections in the physical and 
cognitive effort tasks). Correlations between all variables are shown in Table 3.  Similar to 
Studies 1 and 2, ESI-BF Disinhibition and Substance abuse subscales were positively 
correlated, r = .36, p < .01.  Correlational analyses were also performed to determine whether 
OSPAN working memory scores should be included as a covariate in subsequent regression 
analyses. OSPAN scores were positively related to the proportion of difficult selections in the 
cognitive effort task, r = .29, p < .01, but were not significantly correlated with difficult 
selections in the physical effort task, r = -.05, p = .64.  Moreover, the proportion of difficult 
task selections on the physical and cognitive effort tasks were not significantly correlated, r = 
.11, p = .26.  This result suggests that physical and cognitive effort expenditure measures are 
not synonymous, but are instead distinct constructs.  No other significant correlations were 
observed. 
 Regression Analysis for the Physical Effort Task. A hierarchical regression analysis 
was conducted to examine the effect of Substance Abuse, Disinhibition, and striatal 
dopamine (as indexed by EBR) on the average proportion of difficult selections in the 
physical effort task.  In the first step, the OSPAN and Order covariates were entered into the 
model.  The omnibus test was nonsignificant at this step, R
2 
= .04, F(2, 101) =  2.04, p = .14, 
and Order was marginally significantly associated with physical effort expenditure (β = -
0.19, p = .053), but the OSPAN working memory measure was a nonsignificant covariate, p 
= .63. In the second step, the first-order terms (substance abuse, disinhibition, and striatal 
dopamine) were entered in the model.  Omnibus prediction at this step of the model was 
nonsignificant, ∆R2 = .02, F(5, 98) =  1.22, p = .31, and none of the first-order predictors 
were significant, ps > .40.  In the third step of the model when the EBR X Substance Abuse 
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and EBR X Disinhibition interaction terms were added, the omnibus test remained 
nonsignificant, ∆R2 = .05, F(7, 96) =  1.66, p = .13.  However, the EBR X Disinhibition 
interaction was a significant predictor of physical effort expenditure for rewards, β = -0.25, p 
= .03.  None of the predictors were significant, ps > .10.   
Given the emerging effects from the EBR X Disinhibition interaction, a reduced 
model with disinhibition, striatal dopamine, and the disinhibition X striatal dopamine 
interaction was also conducted.   However, the results of this reduced model revealed no 
significant main effects, and the interaction was not significant, ps > .10.  
Figure 7 shows simple regression lines for the effect of disinhibition scores on the 
proportion of difficult selections in the physical effort task at (a) the mean for striatal 
dopamine, (b) one standard deviation above the mean for striatal dopamine, and (c) one 
standard deviation below the mean for striatal dopamine. Striatal dopamine and disinhibition 
variables were centered prior to creating the centered interaction terms. The simple 
regression slope coefficients when centered at the mean (β = -.12, p = .25) and at one 
standard deviation above the mean (β = .16, p = .33) were not significant, but the simple 
regression slope coefficient centered at one standard deviation below the mean significantly 
predicted the proportion of difficult task selections during the physical effort task, β = -.45, p 
= .02. At low levels of striatal dopamine, individuals with more disinhibitory tendencies 
tended to choose fewer difficult, physically effortful options. This finding indicates that the 
effect of diminished levels of disinhibition on physical effort expenditure for reward varied 
as a function of tonic dopamine levels.  Specifically, as predicted, individuals reporting high 
levels of disinhibitory behavior with low striatal tonic dopamine were significantly less 
willing to exert more physical effort for larger rewards.  
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Regression Analysis for the Cognitive Effort Task.  An additional regression analysis 
was performed to assess the interaction between externalizing proneness and striatal 
dopamine on cognitive effort expenditure for rewards. As with the physical effort task 
regression, in the first step of the model, the Order and OSPAN working memory measure 
was added as a covariate.  Omnibus prediction at this step of the model was significant, R
2 
= 
.09, F(2, 102) =  5.22, p < .01.  OSPAN working memory was a significant predictor of 
cognitive effort expenditure (β = .29, p < .01), but order effects were not significantly 
predictive of cognitive effort (β = .09, p = .36). In the second step of the model, the first-
order terms (substance abuse, disinhibition, and striatal dopamine) were entered.  The 
omnibus test was marginally significant at this step, ∆R2 = .001, F(5, 99) =  2.04, p = .08, but 
none of the first-order terms were significant predictors, ps > .80.  In the final step of the 
model, the EBR X Disinhibition and EBR X Substance Abuse interaction terms were entered 
into the model.  The omnibus prediction was significant at this step of the model, ∆R2 = .045, 
F(7, 97) =  2.12, p = .049.  The OSPAN covariate (β = .28, p < .01) and the EBR X 
Substance Abuse interaction term (β = 0.22, p = .046) emerged as significant predictors of 
cognitive effort expenditure for rewards. 
Figure 8 shows simple regression lines for the effect of substance abuse scores on the 
proportion of difficult selections in the cognitive effort task at (a) the mean for striatal 
dopamine, (b) one standard deviation above the mean for striatal dopamine, and (c) one 
standard deviation below the mean for striatal dopamine. Striatal dopamine and substance 
abuse variables were centered prior to creating the centered interaction terms. The simple 
regression slope coefficients when centered at the mean (β = .01, p = .93) and at one standard 
deviation above the mean (β = -.26, p = .10) were not significant, but the simple regression 
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slope coefficient centered at one standard deviation below the mean significantly predicted 
the proportion of difficult task selections during the cognitive effort task, β = .43, p = .01. At 
low levels of striatal dopamine, individuals with higher substance abuse tendencies tended to 
choose more difficult, cognitively effortful options. This result suggests that the effect of 
increasing levels of substance abuse on cognitive effort expenditure for reward varied as a 
function of tonic dopamine levels.  Individuals reporting high levels of substance abuse with 
low striatal tonic dopamine were willing to exert more cognitive effort in an attempt to attain 
larger rewards.  
Discussion.  The results of this study support my hypothesis that striatal dopamine 
would moderate the effects of trait disinhibition on effort expenditure for rewards.  In 
particular, at low levels of tonic dopamine, individuals with high disinhibitory tendencies 
were more inclined to choose smaller, less effortful reward options on the physical effort 
task.  This finding is also consistent with the results of Study 1 on reward wanting, as well as 
other previous research on D2 receptor availability and effort expenditure (Daberkow et al., 
2013; Trifilieff et al., 2013; Trifilieff & Martinez, 2014; Wardle et al., 2011).  Contrary to my 
prediction that more disinhibited individuals with high tonic dopamine levels would have a 
greater tendency to exert more effort for larger rewards, the simple slopes regression for one 
standard deviation above the mean of striatal dopamine was nonsignificant.  However, the 
direction of this relationship was positive, suggesting a potential weak relationship between 
high dopamine levels and high effort expenditure for rewards in individuals with high levels 
of disinhibitory tendencies.  Additionally, in comparison with Studies 1 and 2, disinhibition 
scores in this study had a smaller range that was more positively skewed.  It is therefore 
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possible that with a broader range of disinhibition scores, this relationship could become 
significant.   
As predicted, a significant interaction between striatal dopamine and substance on 
cognitive effort expenditure was observed.  In particular, at low levels of tonic dopamine, 
substance abuse was associated with increased cognitive effort expenditure for larger 
rewards.  Moreover, a statistical trend was also observed at high levels of dopamine such that 
substance abuse was associated with reduced effort expenditure for larger rewards.  This 
result builds on the reward learning findings from Study 1.  Collectively, these results 
indicate that individuals with low tonic dopamine and higher substance abuse tendencies 
show poor learning of rewards that lead to long-term rewards and are willing to exert more 
effort for larger immediate rewards.  Thus, among individuals with substance abuse 
problems, low striatal tonic dopamine levels appears to be associated with both enhanced 
learning of choices that maximize immediate rewards, as opposed to long-term rewards, and 
increased effort expenditure to attain immediate rewards.   
Importantly, the relationship between striatal dopamine and disinhibition on effort 
expenditure for rewards was specific to physical effort and did not generalize to cognitive 
effort expenditure.  In direct contrast to this relationship, the interaction between striatal 
dopamine and substance abuse on effort expenditure was specific to the cognitive effort task 
and did not generalize to the physical effort task.  Furthermore, effort expenditure for 
physical and cognitive effort tasks was not significantly correlated.  Together, these results 
suggest that effort expenditure for rewards appears domain-specific.   
Previous neuroimaging work has demonstrated that motivation for large rewards and 
high effort expenditure on math problems show overlapping activation in the ventral striatum 
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and anterior cingulate cortex (Vassena et al., 2014).  Physical effort expenditure for rewards 
has been shown to rely on the anterior putamen area of the striatum (Kurniawan et al., 2010). 
Additionally, theoretical modeling work suggests that while context specific effects may 
govern willingness to expend effort for rewards, physical effort and cognitive effort entail 
similar neural circuitry. This model theorizes that deficits in physical and cognitive effort 
exertion should be correlated (Verguts, Vassena, & Silvetti, 2015). However, the 
experimental data presented in this study suggest otherwise; specifically, willingness to exert 
physical effort and cognitive effort are indeed not correlated. Thus, the results of this study 
challenge existing theoretical work on effort expenditure for rewards and highlight the need 
to compare the neural and behavioral correlates of each of these types of effort expenditure.  
For example, one possibility is that physical effort relies more on motor demands, while 
cognitive effort may instead depend more on cognitive stability, resistance to distraction, and 
cognitive resources.  These factors may be integral to reward motivation and may have 
different “costs” to some individuals compared to others.  Thus, physical and cognitive effort 
expenditure may be particularly sensitive to individual differences. 
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5. STUDY 4: COMPETITION BETWEEN INHIBITION AND REWARD 
The purpose of Study 4 was to capitalize on the externalizing proneness and reward 
processing findings in Studies 1 through 3 in order to try to determine how cognitive control 
is affected by reward motivation in individuals with externalizing tendencies.  Broadly, 
externalizing behaviors are characterized by dysregulation in the cognitive control and 
positive valence systems RDoC domains.  Like reward processing, cognitive control is 
critically dependent on striatal dopamine, particularly dopamine D2 receptor functioning 
(Colzato et al., 2010).  An abundance of research suggests that individuals with substance 
abuse problems tend to have deficits in response inhibition, as indicated by slower stop signal 
reaction times (SSRTs) on the stop signal task (Colzato et al., 2007; Ersche et al., 2011; 
Goudriaan et al., 2005; Li et al., 2006; Monterosso et al., 2005; Moreno et al., 2012; Rubio et 
al., 2008; Smith & Mattick, 2013).  However, while trait disinhibition and inhibitory motor 
control may intrinsically seem related, a meta-analysis on the association between trait 
impulsivity and SSRTs showed only a weak, nonsignificant relationship (Lijffijt, et al., 
2004).  Other work suggests the possibility that drug users may have had increased trait 
disinhibition before they start abusing drugs (Van der Plas et al., 2009; Vonmoos et al., 
2013).  Because impulsivity and substance use are highly correlated, it is possible that 
impairment in response inhibition is due to a pre-existing liability for impulse-control and 
substance use problems, rather a consequence of regular drug use.  
Given these previous findings on the associations between externalizing proneness 
and inhibitory control as well as the findings from the present investigation, the task in Study 
4 was designed to incorporate a reward motivation component into a classic inhibitory 
control task: the stop signal task.  This paradigm allows for testing individual differences in 
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the ability to voluntarily inhibit a prepotent or ongoing motor response (Logan & Cowan, 
1984).  Furthermore, the SSRT measure from this task provides an estimated duration of the 
time that it takes to inhibit this response, such that longer SSRTs are indicative of poorer 
inhibitory control.  
The findings presented in Studies 1 – 3 of this investigation collectively suggest that 
trait disinhibition is more strongly associated with reward wanting, while substance abuse is 
more closely related to reward learning, devaluation, and effort expenditure for rewards.  
Because both disinhibition and substance abuse are associated with reward motivation, 
despite different associations with different components of reward processing, it was 
predicted that:  
(1) Disinhibition and substance abuse would be associated with poorer response 
inhibition, as indicated by slower SSRTs and reduced Stop trial accuracy, in the 
standard stop signal task. 
(2) Individuals with high disinhibition and low tonic dopamine (enhanced reward 
wanting) would show improved inhibitory control (faster SSRTs and higher accuracy) 
when there was a reward offered for correct inhibition relative to when there was not 
a reward offered. This result is expected because increased reward wanting may 
enhance motivation for immediate rewards, which can only be obtained with accurate 
inhibitory control on the task in Study 4. Thus, desire for immediate rewards is 
expected to enhance inhibitory control in this group. 
(3) Individuals with high substance abuse and low tonic dopamine (poorer reward 
learning and increased effort expenditure for rewards) would show poorer inhibitory 
control (slower SSRTs) when there was a reward offered for correct inhibition 
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relative to when there was not a reward offered.  The results from Studies 1 – 3 
suggest that the high substance abuse, low dopamine group shows poorer reward 
learning and increased effort expenditure for large rewards.  These findings suggest 
that this group is motivated by immediate rewards, even when it leads to a greater 
effort cost or maladaptive long-term performance. Thus, in an effort to obtain 
immediate rewards, this group may also be more likely to risk an associated response 
time “cost,” as indicated by slower SSRTs, when rewards are provided for correct 
inhibition. 
5.1 Participants 
Ninety-five undergraduate students (62 females; age range 18 - 23) completed the 
study for partial course credit in their introduction to psychology course.  
5.2 Materials and Design 
Externalizing Spectrum Inventory–Brief Form.  In line with the previous studies in 
this investigation, the ESI-BF was used to measure trait disinhibition and substance abuse 
tendencies.  
Spontaneous Eyeblink Rate (Tonic Dopamine Index). Spontaneous EBR was used as 
an index of striatal tonic dopamine. The same procedure that was described in Study 1 was 
followed for Study 4 to measure EBR. 
Stop Signal Reward Task. In the first phase of the task (Figure 9a), participants 
performed a standard stop signal task in which a green left or right arrow was presented 
(Logan, Schachar, & Tannock, 1997; Moreno et al., 2012). In line with instructions given in 
previous research (Congdon et al., 2012), on Go trials, participants were instructed to 
respond as quickly as possible, while keeping in mind that a red arrow may appear 
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occasionally, by pressing the left arrow key when the arrow faced leftward and the right key 
when the arrow faced rightward (see Appendix C for exact instructions).  If the arrow turned 
red after the original arrow was presented, then participants were instructed to inhibit their 
response on that trial.  The red arrow cue was presented at 200ms, 300ms, or 400ms 
(randomly varied) after the original arrow was presented.  Participants had up to 2 seconds to 
respond on each trial.  After they made a response, the arrow would disappear and the screen 
would be black (for up to 1.9 seconds) until the next trial began.  A 1 second delay, indicated 
by a black screen, was shown before the ITI.  The inter-trial interval (ITI) varied between 
700ms, 1000ms, or 1300ms (randomly varied) after the end of the previous trial and appeared 
as a white fixation cross, which was shown for 1 second.   
In the second phase of the task (Figure 9b), participants received instructions that they 
would now have an opportunity to earn a monetary bonus of up to ten dollars based on their 
performance in the rest of the task.  They were told that the bonus was based on both how 
quickly and accurately they responded on go trials and how accurately they responded on 
stop trials. Instructions also indicated that if they responded too slowly or made too many 
mistakes on go trials, then they may not receive a bonus even if they correctly stopped their 
response on stop trials.  In reality, however, half of the Stop trials were accompanied by a 
reward of $0.50 for correct inhibition. The reward feedback was presented immediately 
before the ITI screen for 1 second.  The probability of each trial being a Go trial was 75%, 
and the probability of a Stop trial was 25%. For both the standard stop signal and reward 
phase, the range of Go trials across participants was 141 – 162 trials. Reaction time (RT) and 
accuracy for Go and Stop trials were measured for each phase separately. Additionally, a 
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difference measure between unrewarded phase and reward phase stop signal reaction times 
(SSRTs), Go trial RT, and Stop trial accuracy were computed. 
5.3 Procedure 
Participants began the session with a 6-min assessment of EBR. Participants then 
completed demographics questionnaires (gender, age, hours slept), the ESI-BF Disinhibition 
and Substance Abuse subscales, and then completed 12 (~75% Go trials, ~25% Stop trials) 
practice trials of the standard stop signal task.  Participants completed 200 trials (~75% Go 
trials and ~25% Stop trials) of the standard stop signal phase, and 200 trials of reward phase 
of the task (~75% Go trials and ~25% Stop trials).  Upon completion of the study, 
participants received their monetary bonus and were debriefed about the nature of the study.  
5.4 Data Analysis 
 
Correlations between independent variables (EBR, substance abuse, and 
disinhibition) and dependent measures (SSRT, Go trial RT, Stop trial accuracy, rewarded – 
unrewarded SSRT, rewarded – unrewarded Go trial RT, rewarded – unrewarded Stop trial 
accuracy) were performed.  To compute SSRT, the integration approach was employed 
(Verbruggen & Logan, 2009).  In this approach, the Go trial reaction times are rank ordered. 
Then, the average unsuccessful stop trials, or errors, are multiplied by the number of Go 
trials. The rank ordered Go trial RT that corresponds to that value is the RT value. For 
example, if a participant was unsuccessful on 36% of stop trials and completed 150 trials, the 
RT value would correspond to the RT for the 54
th
 percentile. The average stop signal delay 
(.27s - .34s) is then subtracted from the RT value.  Additionally, regression analyses with 
EBR, substance abuse, disinhibition, and their interaction terms will be performed separately 
for each of the dependent measures. A reduced model with EBR, disinhibition, and EBR X 
47 
disinhibition and a model with EBR, substance abuse, and EBR X substance abuse was also 
performed when one of interaction terms was significant or trended towards significance. 
5.5 Results and Discussion 
Descriptive Statistics. Individual EBRs ranged from 2.50 to 40.80 blinks/min (M = 
14.82, SD = 8.55). Scores on the ESI-BF Disinhibition subscale ranged from 0 to 33 (M = 
11.61, SD = 6.37) and the range of scores on the ESI-BF Substance Abuse subscale ranged 
from 0 to 51 (M = 15.71, SD = 13.31).  
In the standard stop signal phase of the task, Go trial accuracy rates ranged from .96 – 
1.0 (M = .99, SD = .01), and Stop trial accuracy rates ranged from 0.0 – 1.0 (M = .52, SD = 
.28).  Average Go RT ranged from 0.34s – 0.88s (M = .55, SD = .12), and average SSRT 
ranged from 0.6s - .53s (M = .21, SD = .07).  In the rewarded phase of the stop signal task, 
Go trial accuracy rates ranged from .81 = 1.0 (M = .99, SD = .02), and Stop trial accuracy 
ranged from 0 – 1 (M = .64, SD = .27).  Average Go RT in the reward phase ranged from 
.35s - .95s (M = .58, SD = .12), and average SSRT ranged from .12s - .49s (M = .20, SD = 
.06).  Paired samples t-tests between these dependent measures in the standard stop signal 
and reward phase were also computed.  No significant differences in Go trial accuracy (p = 
.40) or SSRT (p = .15) between tasks were observed.  However, participants were 
significantly more accurate in inhibiting their response on Stop trials in the reward phase than 
in the standard phase, t(94) = -6.10, p < .001.  Participants were also significantly slower in 
their Go trial response times in the reward phase and in the standard phase, t(94) = -2.78, p < 
.01.  One possible implication of these results is that providing a reward for correct inhibition 
successfully improved inhibitory control across all participants, but this came at a cost of 
approximately a 250ms delay in response for Go trials in the reward phase.  However, it is 
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important to note that the reward phase was performed after the standard phase, and thus this 
difference could also be due to an effect of practice, rather than an effect of providing a 
reward. 
 Correlational Analyses. Correlations were computed between the independent 
measures (EBR index of striatal dopamine, ESI-BF Substance Abuse, and ESI-BF 
Disinhibition) and the outcomes measures (Standard stop signal task Stop trial accuracy, Go 
trial RT, SSRT, and rewarded – unrewarded Stop trial accuracy, Go trial RT, and SSRT). 
Correlations between all variables are presented in Table 4.  ESI-BF Disinhibition and 
Substance abuse subscales were positively correlated, r = .37, p < .01.  Of the demographics 
variables, age was significantly correlated with SSRT (r = .26, p = .01), rewarded – 
unrewarded phase SSRT (r = .24, p = .04), and rewarded – unrewarded phase Stop trial 
accuracy (r = .27, p < .01).  However, no other factors showed significant correlations, ps > 
.10. 
Regression Analysis for Stop Accuracy in the Standard Stop Signal Phase.  A 
hierarchical regression analysis was performed to test the effect of Substance Abuse, 
Disinhibition, and striatal dopamine (as indexed by EBR) on Stop trial accuracy in the 
standard stop signal phase of the task.  In the first step, age was entered into the model as a 
covariate. However, the omnibus prediction at this step was nonsignificant, R
2 
= .01, F(1, 93) 
=  0.56, p = .46.  In the second step of the model, the first-order terms (substance abuse, 
disinhibition, and striatal dopamine) were added.  Omnibus prediction at this step remained 
nonsignificant, ∆R2 = .04, F(4, 90) =  1.20, p = .32.  Disinhibition was a marginally 
significant predictor (β = -0.20, p = .07), but none of the other factors significantly predicted 
Stop trial accuracy, ps > .30.  In the last step, the EBR X Substance Abuse and EBR X 
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Disinhibition interaction terms were entered into the model.  The omnibus test was 
nonsignificant ∆R2 = .003, F(6, 88) =  0.83, p = .55, and the none of the predictors were 
significantly associated with Stop trial accuracy, ps > .30. 
Regression Analysis for Go Trial Reaction Time in the Standard Stop Signal Phase.  
The same hierarchical regression analysis was conducted for Go trial RT as for Stop trial 
accuracy.  The omnibus test for the age covariate in the first step was nonsignificant, p = .88.  
In the second step of the model, all predictors and the omnibus test were nonsignificant, ps > 
.10.  Similarly, in the third step of the model, none of the interaction terms, first-order 
predictors, or the omnibus test was significant, ps > .20.  
Regression Analysis for SSRT in the Standard Stop Signal Phase.  A parallel 
regression analysis was performed for SSRT in the standard stop signal portion of the task. 
Age was entered as a covariate in the first step of the model, and the omnibus test was 
significant, R
2 
= .07, F(1, 93) =  6.69, p = .01. In the second step of the model, the first-order 
factors were entered.  None of the predictors nor the omnibus test was significant at this step, 
ps > .09.  Similar, when the interaction terms were added in the last step of the model, none 
of the predictors, interaction terms, or omnibus test was significant, ps > .20.  
Regression Analysis for the Stop Accuracy Difference Measure.  A hierarchical 
regression analysis was conducted for the difference in Stop trial accuracy between the 
rewarded and unrewarded task (rewarded Stop trial accuracy – unrewarded Stop trial 
accuracy). Age was entered into the model in the first step as a covariate, and the omnibus 
test was significant, R
2
 = .07, F(1, 93) = 7.36, p  < .01.  In the second step, the EBR proxy 
measure of striatal dopamine, Substance Abuse, and Disinhibition were added to the model.  
Omnibus prediction was marginally significant at this step, ∆ R2 = .014, F(4, 90) = 2.14, p  = 
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.08, but none of the first-order predictors were significant, ps > .20.  In the final step of the 
model, the interaction terms were entered into the model.  However, the interaction terms, 
first-order predictors, and omnibus prediction were nonsignificant, ps > .10.  
Regression Analysis for Go Trial Reaction Time Difference Measure.  The same 
hierarchical regression analysis was conducted for the Go trial RT difference measure 
(rewarded Go trial RT – unrewarded Go trial RT) as for Stop trial difference measure.  The 
omnibus test for the age covariate in the first step was nonsignificant, p = .11.  In the second 
step of the model, all predictors and the omnibus test were nonsignificant, ps > .10.  
Similarly, in the third step of the model, none of the interaction terms, first-order predictors, 
or the omnibus test was significant, ps > .10.  
Regression Analysis for SSRT Difference Measure.  A final hierarchical regression 
was performed for the SSRT difference measure (rewarded SSRT – unrewarded SSRT). In 
the first step of the model, Age was added as a covariate.  The omnibus test was significant at 
this step, R
2 
= .04, F(1, 93) = 4.15, p = .045.  In the second step, the first-order terms were 
entered (EBR, Substance Abuse, Disinhibition). However, neither the first-order predictors 
(ps > .60) nor the omnibus prediction was significant, ∆R2 = .01, F(4, 90) = 1.13, p = .35.  
Age remained a significant predictor (β = -.21, p = .048).  In the last step of the model, the 
EBR X Substance Abuse and EBR X Disinhibition interactions were added, ∆R2 = .05, F(6, 
88) = 1.51, p = .19.  At this step, the EBR X Substance Abuse interaction term (β = .48, p = 
.08) was a marginally significant predictor in the difference in SSRT from the standard stop 
signal task to the rewarded task. None of other predictors were significant in this step, ps > 
.10. 
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Given the statistical trend for the EBR X Substance Abuse interaction, a reduced 
model with Age, EBR, Substance Abuse, and the EBR X Substance Abuse interaction term 
was conducted.  As with the full model, Age was entered as a covariate in the first step of the 
model, and the omnibus prediction was significant, R
2 
= .04, F(1, 93) = 4.15, p = .045.  In the 
second step of the model, EBR and Substance Abuse were entered.  At this step, the omnibus 
test was nonsignificant, ∆R2 = .003, F(3, 91) = 1.46, p = .23, and neither predictor was 
significant, ps > 50.  The Age covariate was significant at this step, β = -.22, p = .04. In the 
final step, the EBR X Substance Abuse interaction term was entered.  Omnibus prediction 
was marginally significant, ∆R2 = .04, F(4, 90) = 2.22, p = .07.   However, the EBR X 
Substance Abuse interaction emerged as a significant predictor of SSRT at this step, β = .52, 
p = .04. 
Figure 10 shows simple regression lines for the effect of substance abuse scores on 
the SSRT difference measure at (a) the mean for striatal dopamine, (b) one standard 
deviation above the mean for striatal dopamine, and (c) one standard deviation below the 
mean for striatal dopamine. Striatal dopamine and substance abuse variables were centered 
prior to creating the centered interaction terms. The simple regression slope coefficients 
when centered at the mean (β = .06, p = .54) and at one standard deviation above the mean (β 
= -.17, p = .27) were not significant, but the simple regression slope coefficient centered at 
one standard deviation below the mean significantly predicted the difference in SSRT from 
the unrewarded to rewarded part of the stop signal task, β = .30, p = .058.  At low levels of 
striatal dopamine, individuals with higher substance abuse tendencies had slower SSRTs on 
the rewarded part of the task relative to the unrewarded phase.  This result suggests that 
striatal tonic dopamine moderates the effect of substance abuse on incentivized inhibitory 
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control.  Specifically, individuals reporting high levels of substance abuse with low striatal 
tonic dopamine were slower, indicative of poorer cognitive control, in inhibiting their 
responses on Stop trials in the rewarded phase of the task.  
Discussion.  The results of Study 4 support the hypothesis that dopamine would 
moderate the effect of substance abuse on inhibitory control.  In particular, individuals with 
high substance abuse and low striatal tonic dopamine showed deficits in inhibitory control in 
the rewarded phase of the task.  Despite the decrements in inhibitory reaction time, no 
performance deficits in stop signal accuracy were observed, suggesting that individuals with 
substance abuse problems and low tonic dopamine are still able to inhibit their responses, but 
that reward motivation significantly slows this ability.  Consequently, rather than reward 
improving cognitive control, motivation for immediate rewards slowed performance in this 
group, resulting in slower response inhibition.  Thus, reward motivation seems to essentially 
“backfire” in this group:  when there is a competition between reward and inhibitory control, 
dopamine involved in reward processing overrides inhibitory control mechanisms.  As a 
result, individuals with substance abuse problems and low tonic dopamine may be less 
successful in attaining the rewards that motivate them and have greater difficulty in 
inhibiting their responses.  One potential mechanism for this result is that at low tonic 
dopamine levels, phasic bursts release more striatal dopamine than individuals with high 
tonic dopamine (Grace, 1995; 2000).  Thus, in this low tonic dopamine group, phasic bursts 
may release an excess of dopamine that impairs inhibitory control mechanisms, but heightens 
motivation for immediate rewards.  Future work is needed to test this possibility 
conclusively, however.   
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In contrast to the hypothesis that externalizing proneness would be associated with 
poorer SSRTs and accuracy in the standard stop signal phase of the task, no significant 
correlations or main effects of substance abuse or disinhibition on these factors was 
observed.  This result, though unexpected, may indicate that heavier or longer duration of 
drug use may drive previously observed deficits in inhibitory control.  Additionally, the 
hypothesis that striatal dopamine and disinhibition would interact to improve response 
inhibition was not observed in this study.  An important consideration in this sample, 
however, is that disinhibition scores represented a smaller range and lower mean that those 
reported in Studies 1 – 3.  Consequently, the high disinhibition group in this sample may be 
more similar to the moderate or average disinhibition group in the studies reported 
previously. A restriction of range for disinhibition therefore tempers the conclusions that can 
be drawn from this study about disinhibition and the competition between reward and 
inhibitory control processes, and future work is needed to determine how higher levels of 
disinhibition influence the interaction between these cognitive processes.  
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6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 The goal of the present investigation was to characterize the effects of externalizing 
proneness on distinct aspects of reward processing and determine the role of striatal 
dopamine in moderating these relationships. Previous work broadly suggests that 
externalizing behavior may be associated with dysregulation in reward sensitivity and 
inhibitory control (e.g., Bechara & Damasio, 2002; Krueger et al., 2007; Patrick et al., 2013).   
However, the RDoC matrix portrays a complex picture of the distinct behavioral and neural 
correlates that underlie different aspects of reward processing.  Despite the moderate 
prevalence of externalizing behaviors, prior to this investigation, there had not been any 
studies that systematically examined which aspects of reward processing were altered in 
individuals with externalizing tendencies.  The findings of this investigation demonstrate that 
phenotypically unique manifestations of externalizing behaviors, namely disinhibition and 
substance abuse, exert differential effects on reward processing.  In particular, disinhibition 
was associated with reward wanting and physical effort expenditure for rewards.  In contrast, 
substance abuse was more strongly linked to reward learning, reward devaluation sensitivity, 
cognitive effort expenditure for rewards, and reward-incentivized inhibitory control. 
Although previous research has shown that a common heritable vulnerability, including 
variation in striatal dopaminergic genes, contributes to externalizing behaviors (Krueger, 
1999; Krueger & Markon, 2006; Krueger, McGue, Iacono, 2001; Krueger et al., 2002), 
results from the current study demonstrate that the specific manifestation of the behavior can 
differentially impact unique behavioral aspects of reward processing.   
 In addition to examining specific behavioral correlates of reward processing, this 
investigation also incorporated a measure of striatal tonic dopamine.  This assessment was 
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included to assess how differences in individuals’ underlying neurobiology influence the 
relationship between externalizing behaviors and reward processing. The results demonstrate 
that the effects of externalizing proneness on reward processing are critically dependent on 
striatal dopamine.  Specifically, the effect of disinhibition on reward wanting and physical 
effort expenditure for rewards were exclusive to individuals with low striatal tonic dopamine 
levels.  Additionally, the effects of substance abuse on reward learning, cognitive effort 
expenditure for rewards, and reward-incentivized cognitive control vary depending on 
individual differences in tonic dopamine levels.  Thus, these results uniquely demonstrate 
that substance abuse and disinhibition not only affect distinct reward processes, but that these 
effects depend on variation in striatal dopamine levels.   
In line with my predictions, among individuals with high disinhibitory tendencies, 
only those with low tonic dopamine showed increased reward wanting and chose smaller, 
less physically effortful reward options. This finding suggests that phasic dopamine (low 
tonic dopamine) increases immediate desire for rewards, or wanting, and enhances 
preferences for less effortful, small rewards in individuals with higher disinhibitory traits.  
This result is also consistent with previous research showing that disinhibition is associated 
with increased preference for immediate rewards (de Wit et al., 2007) as well as work on 
dopamine and effort expenditure for rewards (Trifilieff et al., 2013; Trifilieff & Martinez, 
2014).  A potential implication of this result is that high-disinhibited individuals with low 
striatal tonic dopamine may comprise a maximum-liability group.  Specifically, it appears 
that in high-disinhibited individuals, low tonic dopamine increases preference for immediate, 
less effortful rewards at the expense of more effortful, goal-directed options that could 
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increase long-term rewards. This group therefore seems to be driven by easy, immediately 
rewarding choices without considering or seeking options that offer larger long-term benefits.  
The effects of substance abuse on reward processing were also dependent on 
individual variation in striatal tonic dopamine levels. Individuals with more substance abuse 
problems and high tonic dopamine showed enhanced long-term reward learning. As such, 
these findings also support previous work showing that substance abuse is associated with 
enhanced associative learning of rewards (Hogarth et al., 2013). The implication of this result 
could be that higher levels of tonic dopamine might facilitate improved reward learning in 
individuals with high levels of substance use.  Alternatively, alcohol or drug users with high 
tonic dopamine levels may be strategically reward-oriented rather than impulsively driven by 
immediate desires.   
In contrast, individuals with more substance abuse problems and low tonic dopamine 
showed comparatively poorer long-term reward learning, indicating that this group tended to 
learn action-reward contingencies that maximized immediate reward as opposed to long-term 
rewards.  These results suggest that learning of long-term action-reward contingencies 
depends on tonic dopamine levels in individuals with substance abuse problems. 
Furthermore, individuals with substance abuse problems and low tonic dopamine were 
willing to exert more cognitive effort in an attempt to attain larger immediate rewards.  They 
also showed inhibitory control deficits on the reward incentivized portion of the stop signal 
task relative to the unrewarded phase.  Thus, individuals with high substance abuse problems 
and low tonic dopamine show better learning reward-action contingencies that maximize 
immediate reward, as opposed to long-term rewards, and are willing to exert greater 
cognitive effort to attain such rewards.  In a drug context, one possible extension of these 
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findings is that these individuals may be more willing to exert greater effort to obtain and use 
drugs to attain the immediately rewarding feeling that drugs elicit. Furthermore, in contexts 
when there is a competition between reward motivation, such as the positive feelings drug 
use elicit, and inhibitory control, such as trying not to use drugs, these individuals may have 
greater difficulty in inhibiting the urge or desire to use. Outside of reward contexts, substance 
users may not show substantial deficits in inhibitory control.  However, in contexts where 
rewards (like drugs) are at stake, individuals with low tonic dopamine may be more 
motivated to attain the reward at the expense of inhibitory control processes. Collectively, 
these findings suggest that substance users with low tonic dopamine may be at higher risk for 
transitioning from recreational substance use to addiction, while high striatal tonic dopamine 
may be a protective factor in risk for addiction and maladaptive reward processing.  
However, Study 2 demonstrated that substance abuse, independent of striatal 
dopamine, was associated with reduced reward devaluation sensitivity.  Once reward-
outcome associations are well learned, individuals with substance abuse problems—
regardless of variation in striatal tonic dopamine levels—have difficulty disengaging from 
habitual responding.  Thus, while striatal dopamine influences reward learning, habit 
formation, effort expenditure, and inhibitory control, it does not appear to moderate the 
effects of substance abuse on reward disengagement, or “habit breaking,” in individuals with 
substance abuse problems. Striatal dopamine therefore appears to influence reward salience 
during contexts of extended learning, but not disengagement from those reward-outcome 
associations.   
Limitations. One limitation to these tasks is that they are designed to assess learning 
from rewards only.  In particular, elevated tonic dopamine levels have been shown to support 
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reward learning, whereas diminished tonic dopamine levels reinforce avoidance, or 
punishment, learning (Frank, Seeberger, & O’Reilly, 2004).  The distinction between reward 
and punishment learning is important for understanding the mechanistic effect of tonic 
dopamine on disinhibition and substance abuse.  However, the question of how disinhibition 
and substance abuse relate to punishment learning, such as learning from monetary losses, 
lies outside the scope of this investigation. In addition, further work is needed to determine 
whether the effect of tonic dopamine on reward wanting and learning extends to contexts 
involving both gains and losses.  
In considering the generalizability of the current results, it should be noted that the 
goal of this study was primarily to examine individual differences in externalizing tendencies 
in the general population, and not to characterize individuals with severe clinical-level 
impulse control or substance use disorders.  It is certainly conceivable that severe problems 
of these types may be associated with different reward processing patterns than those 
observed in our college student sample.  Furthermore, spontaneous eyeblink rate is an 
indirect marker of striatal tonic dopamine levels and thus inferences should be made with 
caution.  Additional techniques, such as PET imaging, are needed to directly establish 
relationships between externalizing problems and altered striatal dopamine activity in reward 
processing contexts.  Finally, while current results provide evidence for associations between 
externalizing problems and aberrant reward processing, I do not purport that striatal tonic 
dopamine levels causally affect reward processing.   
Conclusions. This investigation is the first to demonstrate that disinhibition and 
substance abuse exert different effects on reward processing, depending on variations in 
striatal tonic dopamine levels. Externalizing problems may reflect either an enhanced desire 
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for rewards, or augmented associative linking of reward stimuli to their outcomes and 
willingness to exert cognitive effort to attain them.  Moreover, problems with substance 
abuse extend beyond reward learning, effort expenditure, and habit formation.  Substance 
abuse, independent of dopaminergic variation, is also associated with increased difficulty in 
disengaging from, or “breaking,” learned habits.  The results of these studies not only reveal 
the exact nature of the dissociable role of trait disinhibition and substance abuse on specific 
aspects of reward processing, but also provide a neural mechanism to account for these 
relationships. Moreover, these results demonstrate that low striatal tonic dopamine in 
individuals with externalizing proneness may represent a risk factor for addiction or 
additional externalizing problems. These findings underscore the importance of considering 
individual differences in dopaminergic functioning to determine cognitive correlates of 
externalizing proneness and risk for addiction.   
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APPENDIX A 
FIGURES 
Figure 1. Reward structure (left) and sample screen shot (right) of the reward learning task in 
Study 1. 
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Figure 2. Simple regression slopes for the effect of disinhibition on reward wanting and 
substance abuse on reward learning in Study 1. 
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Figure 3. Overview of the two-stage reinforcement learning task in Study 2. 
76 
Figure 4.  Scatterplot of the relationship between substance abuse and devaluation sensitivity 
(valued – devalued trials) in Study 2. 
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Figure 5.  Simple regression slopes for the effect of substance abuse on the model-free 
index in Study 2.  
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Figure 6.  Sample trial of the physical effort task (top) and cognitive effort task (bottom) in 
Study 3.   
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 Figure 7. Simple regression slopes for the effect of disinhibition on physical effort 
expenditure for rewards in Study 3. 
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Figure 8. Simple regression slopes for the effect of substance abuse on cognitive effort 
expenditure for rewards in Study 3.   
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Figure 9. Sample of a stop trial in the standard stop signal phase of the task and a stop trial 
of the stop signal reward phase of the task in Study 4.   
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Figure 10. Simple regression slopes for the effect of substance abuse on the difference in 
SSRT (rewarded phase SSRT – unrewarded phase SSRT) in Study 4.  
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APPENDIX B 
TABLES 
Table 1 
Correlational Analyses for Study 1 
Substance Abuse Disinhibition  EBR Delay Discounting 
Substance Abuse 
Disinhibition    0.46
**
 
EBR -0.16 -0.05 
Delay Discounting  -0.10 -0.11 0.05 
Reward Learning Task 0.11 0.18 -0.02 -0.18 
Note. Lower delay discounting scores indicate more discounting. 
**indicates significance at the p<.01 level. 
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Table 2 
Correlational Analyses for Study 2 
Substance Abuse Disinhibition EBR Devaluation  MF Index 
Disinhibition 0.49** 
EBR 0.11 0.03 
Devaluation -0.24* 0.04 -0.21* 
MF Index -0.03 0.15 0.01 0.02 
MB Index -0.10 0.07 -0.03 0.07 0.11 
**indicates significance at the p < .01 level. 
*indicates significance at the p < .05 level.
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Table 3 
Correlational Analyses for Study 3 
Substance Abuse Disinhibition EBR Physical Effort Cognitive Effort 
Substance Abuse 
Disinhibition .36** 
EBR 0.08 0.01 
Physical Effort  -0.12 -0.11 -0.06 
Cognitive Effort 0.02 0.01 -0.05 0.11 
OSPAN  0.18 0.08 -0.18 -0.05 .29** 
Note. Physical effort indicates the average proportion of difficult selections in the physical 
task. Cognitive effort reflects the average proportion of difficult selections in the cognitive 
task.  OSPAN indicates the OSPAN working memory assessment measure. 
**indicates significance at the p < .01 level. 
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Table 4 
Correlational Analyses for Study 4 
Substance Abuse Disinhibition EBR 
Substance Abuse 
Disinhibition .37** 
EBR 0.05 0.03 
SST Stop Accuracy -0.01 -0.17 -0.11 
SST Go RT -0.02 -0.17 -0.13 
SST SSRT 0.04 -0.13 -0.03 
Stop Accuracy Diff. 0.03 -0.12 0.04 
Go RT Diff. -0.05 -0.07 0.06 
SSRT Diff. 0.02 0.07 -0.01 
Note. Rewarded – unrewarded dependent measures are indicated by “Diff.” 
SST refers to the standard stop signal task phase. 
**indicates significance at the p < .01 level. 
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APPENDIX C 
In this task, you will see green arrows that point either left or right.  As soon as you 
see the arrow, you should respond as QUICKLY AND ACCURATELY as possible by 
pressing the LEFT arrow key if the arrow points LEFT or the RIGHT arrow key if the arrow 
points RIGHT.  On some trials, the green arrows may turn red.  If the arrow turns RED, you 
should STOP your response immediately and NOT RESPOND to that particular arrow. Still 
respond to the other green arrows after it, unless the arrow turns red. Both going and stopping 
are equally important. Your performance on this task will be measured equally by both how 
fast and accurately you respond. 
 This task is designed to be difficult and for people to make mistakes because we are 
interested in looking at those mistakes. So, don’t get frustrated if it’s difficult. Just make sure 
not to slow down your responses to wait for the red arrow so that you are no longer going 
when you are supposed to, because then you are no longer doing the task. 
 You won’t always be able to stop when you see a red arrow, so just try your best. As  
long as you respond quickly all of the time without pushing the wrong button for arrow 
direction and can stop some of the time, you’re doing the task correctly. 
 It’s also important to concentrate while you’re doing the task. 
 If you have any questions, please ask the experimenter now. 
